INTRODUCTION
T wo opposite trends have recently affected the relationship between the taxable income that companies report to the government and the fi nancial accounting income that they report to investors. In the United States, a "two-book" country in which the two measures are largely independent, the rise of the book-tax gap (i.e., the excess of fi nancial accounting over taxable income), providing suggestive evidence of earnings manipulation and/or tax sheltering, has led to calls for moving towards a one-book system, in which companies generally would have to use the same measure for both purposes (Desai, 2006) . Meanwhile, several previously "one-book" members of the European Union (EU), such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, and France, have moved in the two-book direction (Schon, 2005, 116) .
One interpretation of these opposite trends would be that the grass is always greener on the other side of the tracks. People on each side of the Atlantic, one might surmise, have a better grasp of their own approach's failings than of those arising under the other approach. Examined more closely, however, the opposite trends refl ect complementary and intellectually consistent concerns about the tax-book relationship, rather than contradictory views of a single phenomenon.
American concern about a two-book system relates to the issue of managerial discretion to manipulate the two measures in opposite directions. Managers can more easily both overstate earnings and engage in tax sheltering if neither activity interferes with the other. Thus, proponents of a onebook system argue that "the latitude afforded managers by the dual nature of corporate profi t reporting has contributed to the simultaneous degradation" of both measures (Desai, 2006, 171) .
By contrast, the EU's movement away from a one-book system refl ects concern about political discretion over the defi nition of income. The countries that decoupled fi nancial reporting from legislatively determined taxable income did so by adopting international fi nancial reporting standards (IFRS), which were promoted as a means of providing investors with better information about company performance, as integrated global capital markets increasingly demand (Haller , 2004, 40-41) . 1 To this end, IFRS offers two benefi ts: depoliticization of the process of defi ning income, and cross-border convergence. The latter, however, is an EU goal in tax policy as well as accounting, refl ected in ongoing efforts to reach agreement on a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB).
Internationalization of Income Measures and the U.S. Book-Tax Relationship
2 Accounting convergence has gone faster because EU members are considerably more reluctant to cede national political control over the defi nition of income in the tax realm than the accounting realm. If the EU reaches agreement on a CCCTB, refl ecting similar acceptance of income depoliticization in the tax realm, it could easily revisit the one-book versus two-book choice by determining how the CCCTB and IFRS should relate to each other. 3 Accordingly, the opposite U.S. and EU trends are not intellectually contradictory in substance, and in combination help to illustrate two key points. First, the proper relationship between taxable income and fi nancial accounting income depends in large part on incentive problems at two distinct stages: rule design by the relevant political authorities, and rule application by corporate managers. Second, new multinational institutions such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), established to determine IFRS, or the EU if it develops a widely accepted CCCTB, potentially can affect both the actual and the optimal relationship between the two income measures.
The rest of this paper elaborates on these two points by proceeding as follows. The next section discusses how taxable income and fi nancial accounting income might differ in the absence of the managerial and political incentive problems that affect income measurement. The third and fourth sections discuss the implications of those two sets of problems for the relationship between the rules for measuring the two types of income. The fi fth section discusses a recent proposal (from Shaviro (2009a) ) for partial integration of the two U.S. measures, while the sixth explores the signifi cance of international convergence with respect to measuring income. The fi nal section offers a brief summary and conclusion.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES SERVED BY THE TWO MEASURES
In principal, income is a reasonably coherent economic concept, commonly defi ned (for individuals) as equaling the market value of one's consumption plus the change in one's net worth during the relevant accounting period (Simons, 1938, 50) . One can adapt it to a legal entity, such as a corporation, by substituting distributions to owners for consumption. Use of an income measure in any given setting requires motivation, however, potentially affecting how it is best defi ned in that setting.
The tax and fi nancial accounting motivations for measuring income differ markedly. Taxable income determines how tax liabilities are distributed between taxpayers, refl ecting underlying distributional concepts such as earning ability or ability to pay (Shackelford, Slemrod, and Sallee, 2007, 4) . While such concepts logically apply only to individuals, not legal entities, a corporate-level tax on earnings can act as a withholding device, substituting for taxing the earnings directly at the owner level. Financial accounting income, by contrast, provides a discrete informational input to actual and prospective owners of corporate shares who are making ongoing investment decisions regarding whether to buy, hold, or sell such shares at any given market price. Managers and investors often appear to care about the amount reported on the income line even if the exact details of the computation arguably do not affect available information-for example, because a given expense, even if ignored in computing income, is disclosed in footnotes (Walker, 2007, 938) .
The chief implications of these distinct functions include the following. 3. An increasing scholarly consensus holds that consumption taxation might be superior as a distributional instrument to income taxation, since it eliminates the latter system's ineffi cient discouragement of saving and can achieve similar progressivity (see Bankman and Weisbach, 2006; Shaviro, 2007) . One way to make the tax base consumption, rather than income, is through expensing for all business outlays, as distinct from the typical income tax approach in which outlays that create lasting value are recovered only over time. But in fi nancial accounting, investors would likely fi nd an expensing rule (leading to a measure of current net cash fl ow rather than income) informationally inferior, since it would impede evaluating company performance. The difference refl ects that investors, but not the government through its position as a claimant on corporate earnings via the tax system, must make ongoing buy-hold-sell decisions regarding particular companies' shares. The government does not comparably need to make any such determination, as it will automatically receive higher tax payments in the future (in a well-functioning system) if current business outlays increase future earnings. Given this difference, adopting a cash fl ow corporate tax might be an appealing tax reform, but shifting to cash fl ow accounting is unlikely to be an appealing fi nancial accounting reform, as it would reduce the measure's informational value to investors. 5 4. Externalities may make it optimal for the government to subsidize some activities or outlays while penalizing others, and this potentially can be done through the income tax system. Financial accounting, since it merely provides information rather than distributing liabilities, has no exact equivalent. As David Walker (2007, 934) notes, if managers care about reported earnings, "instrumental accounting," or deliberately mismeasuring fi nancial accounting income to serve social policy goals, may similarly affect their behavior. However, the direction of deliberate error would need to be opposite, since here one would encourage a given activity by over-measuring, rather than under-measuring, the income that it yields. 5. Income taxes can be levied on either a tax-inclusive or a tax-exclusive basis-the difference being that the taxes paid are themselves deducted or excluded under the latter methodology but not the former. So long as nominal tax rates are suitably adjusted, these two systems can be equivalent and, thus, it may not matter which is adopted. In the fi nancial accounting setting, however, investors presumably care about after-tax income, since taxes paid affect the resources available for distribution to owners. Accordingly, for fi nancial reporting purposes, it is important to treat the taxes paid as deductible. * * * * These considerations suggest that optimally designed taxable and fi nancial accounting income measures might have various differences, based solely on the two measures' distinct purposes. Still, the two measures would have a lot in common apart from requiring a set of discrete adjustments, such as in their treatment of domestic and foreign tax liabilities, and there is no implication that they would employ distinct approaches to the basic task of measuring changes in net worth (leaving aside the effects of distributions) based on observed cash fl ows and transactions.
The most commonly cited difference in the literature between the tax and accounting measures is that suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court in Thor Power Tool Company v. Commissioner, 6 where the Court stated that fi nancial accounting income, but not taxable income, aims towards "conservatism" and is "hospitable to estimates, probabilities, and reasonable certainties." Rather than following from the two measures' functions, however, this distinction appears designed to counter the incentives of corporate offi cers, who might be all too willing to use undue conservatism and low-ball estimates when gauging taxable (but not fi nancial accounting) income.
7 Accordingly, I next turn to the significance of managerial incentive issues for the design of rules defi ning the two types of income.
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE PROBLEMS AND THE BOOK-TAX RELATIONSHIP
Since companies report on their own income to the tax and accounting authori-5 There also is likely to be a stronger case for selective expensing of some capital outlays in the income tax than in fi nancial accounting, if one assumes that uniform expensing is politically unfeasible. But see Gentry and Hubbard (1997) arguing that inter-asset distortions generally are more signifi cant economically than the intertemporal distortion that results from having an income tax rather than a consumption tax, arguably with the implication that a uniform income tax is likely to be superior to a mixed system. 6 439 U.S. 522, 539 (1979) . 7 An additional reason for mandating accounting conservatism might be to assist investors in limiting losses by informing them of bad news and potential downsides as early as possible.
ties, managers' incentives with regard to the amounts reported inevitably must fi gure in the income measures' optimal design. Absent these incentive issues, there might be no reason to require, as do both tax and fi nancial accounting, a transactionally based income measure that relies on realization of asset value fl uctuations and that stipulates the use of particular accounting conventions (such as depreciation or amortization) for specifi ed outlays. Rather, one might simply let companies make their best guess concerning their "true" income for the year, all things considered. Relying on transactions and accounting conventions to measure income is a tradeoff, requiring disregard of potentially value-relevant information in order to emphasize that which is relatively objective and verifi able (Shaviro, 2009a, 449) . This, in turn, still leaves corporate managers with at least two types of discretion that they can use to advance their income-measurement ends. The fi rst concerns transaction choice (such as whether to realize a particular gain or loss), while the second concerns how to report income when its amount is legally ambiguous. Concern about managerial incentives can further suggest requiring that transactions meet economic substance or business purpose requirements in order to be recognized for income measurement purposes. Moreover, it may support providing for non-recognition of technically realized gain or loss in circumstances where it is feared that companies would otherwise forego engaging in economically desirable transactions given the effects on reported income. 8 While all these considerations apply analogously to taxable and financial accounting income, the direction of managerial bias is notoriously opposite in the two settings. With respect to taxable income, managers generally prefer to aid both the shareholders and themselves by under-measuring income, so that their companies will owe the government less tax. By contrast, with respect to reported earnings, managers, pursuing their own self-interest to the detriment of fi nancial market transparency, are prone instead to over-measuring income. This alone might suggest that the two measures would optimally restrict managerial discretion differently-for example, by asymmetrically limiting loss recognition for tax purposes and gain recognition for accounting purposes. Moreover, the optimal tradeoffs of social costs against benefi ts in designing rules to offset managerial bias might well differ between the settings even if both treated gain and loss symmetrically (Shaviro, 2009a, 456) . Accordingly, despite the common nature of the problems presented in the two settings by managerial incentives to manipulate reported income, taking these problems into account in rule design seems likely to make welldesigned measures of taxable and fi nancial accounting income look even more different than they would if only their distinct purposes supported differentiating them.
There is a major complicating consideration, however. Rather than designing and applying each measure separately, one could require that the same amount of income be reported for both purposes (subject only to specified permissible causes of divergence), precisely in order to impede managers from simultaneously manipulating reported income in both directions. Under this approach, managers would lose some of their current ability jointly to optimize achievement of their tax and fi nancial reporting goals, because advancing either goal would set back the other.
Two distinct rationales might be advanced in favor of such an approach. First, it might increase the accuracy (relative to economic income) of the amounts reported for one or both purposes. Suppose initially that managers were equally motivated to reduce taxable income on the one hand and infl ate fi nancial accounting income on the other. This might result in their having no net bias with respect to a measure that applied for both purposes. Moreover, while such a scenario seems over-optimistic, it potentially applies to some extent whenever managers have opposite preferences as to the two measures. They may manipulate reported income less (if doing so is costly) once the net payoff declines because desired and undesired effects occur simultaneously.
9 Second, the offset might reduce the resources wasted by managers in transactions designed to manipulate reported income for purposes of either measure.
Two examples may help make both of these potential social payoffs more concrete. Consider corporate tax shelters, or elaborate paper-shuffl ing transactions designed to have as little economic substance as possible (although arranging and executing them consumes resources) and yet to generate tax losses. It is wellknown in the business world that shelter transactions, in order to be marketable, generally should reduce only taxable income, not fi nancial accounting income (Bankman, 1999 (Bankman, , 1780 . Establishing a stronger link between the two measures would make it impossible fully to satisfy this design constraint.
Second, consider the popularity of transactions that involve the use of tax-accounting "hybrid" fi nancial instruments that are classifi ed as debt for tax purposes but as equity for fi nancial accounting purposes (Shaviro, 2009a, 481) . The underlying motivation is to generate interest deductions, reducing net income, solely for tax purposes, and this apparently is considered worth the extra costs, such as from legal and accounting fees, that creating a hybrid instrument may entail. This example differs from that of purchasing a corporate tax shelter in that neither system's treatment of the hybrid fi nancial instrument is necessarily "correct" (unlike simply disallowing net losses generated by paper-shuffl ing), absent coherent and normatively persuasive grounds for distinguishing debt from equity and treating payments solely to holders of the former as tax-deductible. Having separate tax and accounting rules to defi ne debt and equity seems likely to generate needless waste, however, even if we posit that the underlying distinction between the two categories makes no sense.
While forcing managers to use the same income measure for both purposes might both increase reporting accuracy and reduce the cost of wasteful transactions, it also would have drawbacks. Perhaps the biggest one (leaving aside political choice issues, which I discuss next) relates to heterogeneity among corporate managers with respect to their objectives. Whether due to variation in their preferences or their circumstances, some managers may care a lot more about fi nancial accounting income, relative to taxable income, than others do. Non-publicly traded companies, for example, do not even have to issue published fi nancial statements. And even among those subject to reporting requirements, the managers in companies that are relatively closely held may care a lot less about fi nancial accounting income, whether because the shareholders are better-informed or because they themselves are predominant shareholders. Inducing publicly traded companies with diffuse ownership to over-report taxable income relative to other companies might ineffi ciently disfavor them.
The underlying problem here, potentially relating to financial accounting income as well as taxable income, is that the social value of reporting accuracy may depend as much or more on its degree of achievement relatively between companies as absolutely. Thus, suppose all companies reported as taxable income exactly half of their true economic income. One could in theory adjust for this by simply doubling the tax rate, relative to the case where income was reported accurately. By contrast, differential accuracy leads inexorably to uneven tax treatment (all else equal). Likewise, the investment choices that fi nancial accounting income is supposed to help inform may depend as much on comparing companies as on separately evaluating them. Heterogeneity, therefore, potentially undermines the value of inducing earnings-minded managers to report income more accurately, in a manner not similarly applicable to the case for discouraging wasteful transactions by conforming the two income measures.
POLITICAL INCENTIVE PROBLEMS AND THE BOOK-TAX RELATIONSHIP
The rules for defining taxable and fi nancial accounting income are set not by philosopher-kings, or through the scientifi c application of a social welfare calculus, but by designated political actors responding to their own personal and institutional incentives. Accordingly, the relevant agency costs in determining the tax-book relationship include those that would affect the likely design of the rules under different institutional arrangements. This consideration has often played a central role in debate about the book-tax relationship, but without always being framed in suffi ciently general terms.
In the U.S., the rules governing both taxable income and fi nancial accounting income are ultimately subject to legislative control by the Congress. For each, however, Congress has the option of delegating authority to informed professionals who are at least partly insulated from direct political control. As it happens, Congress has chosen to exercise substantial direct political control over the definition of taxable income, subject only to giving the Treasury Department (itself controlled by the Executive Branch) relatively limited regulatory authority. With respect to fi nancial accounting income, by contrast, Congress has opted for a considerably broader delegation of authority. Financial accounting rules generally are set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a professional organization that operates under the aegis of the Financial Accounting Foundation, an independent not-for-profi t entity that is controlled by accountant, managerial, and state and local government organizations. Congress occasionally either intervenes directly with respect to the fi nancial accounting treatment of a given item or else threatens to do so, thereby reminding FASB that its authority persists purely on sufferance. In the 1990s, for example, Senator Joseph Lieberman threatened to eliminate FASB's authority over the defi nition of fi nancial accounting income if it proceeded with a proposal to require that managers' stock options be deducted in calculating fi nancial accounting income (Shaviro, 2009a, 468 n. 152) . However, even when demanding that FASB heed political direction on a particular issue, members of Congress routinely insist that "nobody [is] more committed to the independent setting of accounting standards than I am" or that "I would like to begin by reaffi rming my belief that FASB … is best suited to set accounting standards" (468).
In principle, Congress could, if it liked, similarly delegate the defi nition of taxable income-for example, to an independent agency akin to the Federal Reserve Board, or to tax lawyers through the bar association equivalent of FASB. Its not doing so evidently reflects politicians' much greater interest in controlling the tax base, which they may regard as at the core of their expected prerogatives and which gives them enormous political leverage (Shaviro, 2009a, 466) . Exerting control over fi nancial accounting income may be appealing as well, such as if constituents demand oversight in response to accounting scandals or if campaign contributors express interest in a given outcome, but evidently is considered more tangential, and also can have the political downside of inviting blame for subsequent governance scandals-as Lieberman eventually learned (see, e.g., Baker (2006)).
Neither the Congressionally controlled system for defining taxable income nor the largely FASB-run system for defi ning fi nancial accounting income is entirely ideal. Congress's stewardship over taxable income has received almost uniformly dismal reviews. "For many decades, observers ranging from tax policy experts to political scientists to politicians and ordinary voters who view the tax code as a 'mess' or a 'disgrace' have repeatedly concluded that tax politics is extremely fl awed" (Shaviro, 2009a, 466) . Perhaps the central problem is interest group politics, although aggressive rentseeking by politicians and the tendency to "legislate for legislation's sake" or use the tax code as a device for positiontaking or credit-claiming may have ill effects as well (467).
FASB is not immune from interestgroup influence, but studies suggest that the problem is far less bad here than with Congress (see Shaviro, 2009a, 470) . Perhaps the main complaint about FASB is that, despite its nominal independence from direct control by the accounting profession, it nonetheless unduly serves accountants' interests, such as by devising rules that "justify large fees, while requiring little work and reducing legal risk" (Mundstock, 2003, 817) . Many observers would agree, however, that Congress's track record with respect to taxable income, along with the record of its sporadic but frequently interest-groupdriven interventions in the accounting realm, suggests that the rules for defi ning fi nancial accounting income would likely change for the worse if Congress took a greater direct role in their determination (Hanlon, LaPlante, and Shevlin, 2005) .
This view, if accepted, has important implications for proposals to move towards a one-book system in response to concern about managerial incentives. If such integration between the measures had the effect of increasing Congress's direct control of financial accounting income, any social gain from the hopedfor improvement in managerial incentives might be offset by worsening the impact of bad political incentives. Suppose, for example, that Congress legislated that taxable income would also serve as the official fi nancial reporting measure for public companies. A recent study suggested that this would reduce by approximately 50 percent the explanatory power of earnings (Hanlon, LaPlante, and Shevlin, 2005) , refl ecting the dilution of its information content through the interpolation of politically motivated "noise."
This picture is perhaps too simple, given that responding favorably to interest-group pressures might be more complicated if the same rules had to apply in both the tax and accounting settings. For example, the executives who cheered on Senator Lieberman's war against deducting stock options for book purposes presumably wanted them to remain deductible for tax purposes. However, Congress cannot really be forced to apply the same rules for both purposes when it is not so inclined. Thus, the advantage of preventing managers from simultaneously responding to their opposite incentives in the two realms by requiring tax-book conformity may not comparably apply to Congress, since it continually decides how much conformity there should be. Accordingly, addressing managerial incentive problems through book-tax conformity would create a fundamental challenge: how to limit the harm that might result from inducing greater direct political control over fi nancial accounting income. This problem has no simple answer, but I next examine two particular aspects. First, I briefl y review a partial conformity proposal that I have made elsewhere. Second, I address recent trends towards the internationalization of both the tax and fi nancial accounting measures, and consider how these trends might affect the relevant tradeoffs.
A MODEST PROPOSAL TO MOVE PARTWAY TOWARDS TAX-BOOK CONFORMITY
In Shaviro (2009a), I described a proposal to move partially towards tax-book conformity, in the hope of mitigating managerial incentive problems without greatly worsening political incentive problems. While recognizing that the proposal cannot be adequately evaluated without greater empirical knowledge about the effects that it would have in practice, as well as greater specifi cation concerning the social costs of inaccurate income measurement in both the tax and fi nancial accounting realms, I argued that it was sufficiently promising to merit further consideration. Here, in the hope of encouraging such consideration, I offer a brief description of how it would work and its underlying rationale.
Under the proposal, companies initially would separately determine both taxable and fi nancial accounting income, just as they do currently. However, as a fi nal step in the determination of taxable income, its amount as otherwise determined would be adjusted by a specifi ed percentage, such as 50 percent, in the direction of financial accounting income.
10 Thus, a company with "preliminary" taxable income of $100 million and financial accounting income of $140 million would adjust the preliminary amount by 50 percent of the difference between the two, and report "fi nal" taxable income of $120 million. (As discussed below, however, certain adjustments would fi rst be made to fi nancial accounting income, solely for purposes of applying the rule.)
Further details included the following.
1. For consolidated corporate groups, the adjustment would be made with respect to the fi nancial accounting income of the tax reporting group, not the fi nancial accounting group where these differed. Since 2004, large public companies have been required to include IRS Schedule M-3 with their federal income tax returns, showing the sources of difference between taxable income and financial accounting income. This schedule generally contains the information that such companies would need to make this adjustment. 2. Financial accounting income might also be revised in various other respects, solely for purposes of the taxable income adjustment, before computing final taxable income. Many of the differences between taxable and financial accounting income reflect the two measures' distinct purposes, and may not strongly raise managerial incentive issues. Thus, applying the adjustment to such items arguably would be undesirable. Illustrative examples might include federal income tax liability and illegal bribes (both of which are deducted for book but not tax purposes), business meal and entertainment expenses (only partly deductible for tax purposes), and tax rules matching the timing of stock option deductibility to that of inclusion by the employee. However, even if such items ought to be excluded from the taxable income adjustment on the ground that they refl ect differences between the two measures' underlying purposes, there is an argument for not making a long list, which could end up facilitating the inclusion of spurious items as well (Shaviro, 2009a, 476-7) . 3. A further potential issue relates to deliberate income tax preferences that reduce or defer taxable income relative to financial accounting income. While scaling back the preferences via the taxable income adjustment might be a good end result, one should not assume that Congress would fail to notice that its presumably intended policies were being undermined. Lest it respond either by requiring the preferences to be used in computing fi nancial accounting income or by making them nominally bigger (which might affect taxpayers not subject to the adjustment), one might instead encourage Congress to provide that fi nancial accounting income is modifi ed, solely for purposes of applying the adjustment, to allow the use of specifi ed preferences. 4. In principle, one might like the adjustment to be symmetric, permitting taxable income to be reduced as well as increased. However, managers who lacked strong motivation to infl ate reported earnings would then be able to use the adjustment to reduce their companies' tax liabilities, by regularly reporting fi nancial accounting income that was substantially less than preliminary taxable income. To limit this problem, one might require that reductions in taxable income through application of the adjustment be limited to the amount of prior increases that it had caused.
11 5. One of the toughest dilemmas raised by the proposal concerns its application to non-publicly traded companies. Exempting them seems appropriate given that the underlying managerial incentive to overstate earnings presumably does not apply comparably to them. This, however, would lead to tax bias (all else equal) against publicly traded companies. One possible response would be to treat them more favorably in some other respect-for example, by slightly lowering their marginal rates so the proposal was revenueneutral or burden-neutral.
Perhaps the proposal's clearest advantage is that it would reduce public companies' managers' incentive to devote resources to driving a wedge between taxable and fi nancial accounting income, such as by engaging in tax shelter transactions or constructing costly and complicated tax-accounting hybrid fi nancial instruments. The proposal would also potentially improve the accuracy of income reports for both purposes by creating an offset between managers' desire to infl ate the one measure and reduce the other. This depends, however, on the competing incentives' relative weight, 12 and is subject to the heterogeneity problem discussed earlier.
13
The proposal also aims to minimize any effect on Congress's interest in exerting greater control over the fi nancial accounting rules. The provision for merely a halfway adjustment ensures that taxable and fi nancial accounting income will still otherwise be separately determined. Where Congress cares about the effect on taxable income of a given financial accounting rule, the hope is that it would settle merely for requiring that the rule's effect on the adjustment be negated. One problem to worry about is that members of Congress seeking backdoor tax changes might operate via the fi nancial accounting rules. While interest groups presumably would be less grateful if the price of a tax cut were lower reported earnings, heterogeneity in managerial objectives might make this less of an obstacle in some cases than others.
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
The U.S. has traditionally followed a largely independent approach to defi ning both taxable income and financial accounting income, rather than closely following or seeking to emulate approaches from abroad. Recently, however, global pressures in favor of convergence have started to play a role on the accounting side. Indeed, the FASB chairman recently urged U.S. adoption of IFRS within the next few years, on the ground that " [t] he world has changed and we are not the only big player anymore." 14 With respect to corporate taxable income, no such pressures appear as yet to be felt signifi cantly in the U.S. While global tax competition has increasingly led to calls for lowering the U.S. corporate tax rate (see Shaviro, 2009b, 167) , international tax base coordination has received only sporadic and ad hoc attention here-for example, through legislative and regulatory responses to taxpayer efforts at "cross-border tax arbitrage," or tax planning that exploits small semantic differences between countries' tax rules (see Shaviro (2002) ).
Both institutionally and economically, the EU faces much stronger internal pressures for cross-national convergence in defi ning income than does the U.S. externally. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the EU has moved much further than the U.S. to achieve such convergence, through the adoption of IFRS and the establishment of the ongoing (if slow-moving) CCCTB project. The EU resembles the U.S., however, in fi nding the sacrifi ce of national political authority-a necessary prerequisite to internationalization-easier to countenance for accounting income than taxable income. As noted above, this disjuncture has to date led EU countries to move towards a two-book approach, but general adoption of a CCCTB could lead to renewed consideration of integrating the tax and fi nancial accounting defi nitions of income.
In the U.S., where corporate tax base conformity to some accepted set of international standards appears to be far off on the horizon (if indeed one can espy it at all), it is worth considering how adoption 13 In addition, even if income reports became more accurate in some respects, they might become less accurate in others. For example, applying the proposal solely to U.S. members of a worldwide consolidated group would create an incentive to shift reported fi nancial accounting income from U.S. to foreign group members, thereby diminishing U.S. tax liability without having any effect on the reported fi nancial accounting income of the worldwide group. 14 Quoted in Donna Block, FASB Chief Backs Shift From U.S. Accounting Standards, The Daily Deal, October 26, 2007. FASB and IFRS, in addition to having different rules for a number of different situations (e.g., how to account for derivative fi nancial instruments, and how to defi ne a lease), differ conceptually in that GAAP is generally more rules-based, offering specifi c guidance in particular situations, while IFRS is more principles-based and offers less specifi c guidance. See Deloitte (2008, 6) .
of IFRS would affect the issues posed by the book-tax relationship. An initial question is how such adoption would affect the location of substantive authority over the U.S. defi nition of fi nancial accounting income. At one end of the spectrum, FASB might perform this role largely as it does today, and merely exercise its discretion to follow IFRS most or all of the time. At the other end of the spectrum, even if FASB continued to oversee U.S. accounting practices and to work with the IASB in developing IFRS standards over time, substantive authority over the defi nition might effectively have been transferred overseas. 15 The key difference lies in the extent to which internationalization would reduce the threat of Congressional intervention in the process of defi ning fi nancial accounting income.
If internationalization significantly deterred such intervention, the case for tax-book uniformity, subject only to whatever exceptions (such as for specifi ed tax preferences) Congress chose to mandate on the tax side, would become stronger. Indeed, one key rationale for my suggesting only a 50 percent adjustment-that Congress might refuse to keep its hands off fi nancial accounting rules that fully applied for tax purposes-might lose most of its force if such rules were suffi ciently protected by the combination of IASB independence from U.S. political control 16 and U.S. acceptance of the need to maintain accounting convergence.
Thus, while the main effect of internationalization has been to move Europe from a one-book to a two-book approach, conceivably it could point the other way over the long haul. This depends, however, on countries' willingness to depoliticize the corporate tax base in response to the growing advantages of tax base convergence in an ever more economically integrated world.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Taxable income and fi nancial accounting income are measures that use the same name but serve different purposes, leading to some differences in how they might ideally be defi ned. However, concern about managerial incentive problems may support integrating them, either to increase the accuracy of amounts reported or to reduce the resources that managers expend on reducing taxable income and increasing reported earnings. Political incentive problems, on the other hand, arguably support separating the measures, so that legislative eagerness to control the tax base need not promote politicization of accounting standards. The case for a largely one-book system may grow stronger, however, if pressures for international convergence in defi ning income on both the tax and accounting fronts lead to reduced politicization of both.
